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With access to formal credit proving almost impossible to smallholder farmers, group 
based lending is steadily becoming popular in Africa. However, little is documented on 
the role of such programmes. In this paper, we employ propensity score matching and 
endogenous switching regime methods on a sample of 600 smallholder farmers drawn 
from two agricultural regions in Kenya in 2007. The goal of the survey was to evaluate 
the  economic  impact  of  group  based  credit  programmes  on  smallholder  farmers’ 
productive performance and poverty reduction in Kenya. Our findings reveal gains with 
significant impacts of group based credit on incomes in the range of 300 and 480 euros as 
well as via purchased inputs, with participation in such credit programmes significantly 
constrained by low literacy levels prevalent among a majority of rural farm households, 
influence of gender, with female headed households dominating in membership and little 
participation on the part of male headed households, poor rural access road infrastructure 
and constraints in group management resulting from lack of cohesion as the group grows 
in membership. These factors form the key recommendations for policy intervention to 
achieve sustainability of group based informal lending among farm households in Africa 
and other similar developing nations.  
   
 Key words: Informal Micro-Finance, Smallholder Farmers, Performance in Kenya  
 
 
 1 INTRODUCTION 
Like most Sub-Saharan Africa, Kenya depends to a great extent on the growth of the 
rural sector, where over 60% of the population lives. The Kenyan economy heavily relies 
on the growth of the agricultural sector which accounts for 24.2% of the country’s Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), over 60% of exports, 75% of the total labour force, and over 
80% of industrial raw materials (RoK, 2006). In support of the sector, the Ninth National 
Development  Plan  (RoK,  2002)  to  transform  the  country  into  a  newly  industrialized 
nation  by  the  year  2020  emphasizes  on  the  firm  linkages  between  agriculture  and 
financial  sectors  as  twin  engines  for  faster  economic  growth.    Efforts,  therefore,  to 
improve and sustain the sector's productivity remain crucial to the nation’s economic 
development and the welfare of her people.  
 
However, one of the major constraints in achieving the desired growth levels has been 
growing imbalances in credit demand and supply, particularly with respect to smallholder 
farmers.  Studies  conducted  in  Kenya  (Salasya,  et.al.  1996;  Hassan,  1998;  2000;  De 
Groote et al. 2001; Odendo, et. al, 2002) point at inadequate agricultural credit as the 
main impediment to adoption of improved production methods and growth of the rural 
areas.  Accessing  loans  for  small-scale  agricultural  investments  from  formal  financial 
institutions has proved almost impossible. This has led to emergence of Grameen type 
Micro-Finance  Institutions  (MFIs)  that  lend  via  rural  groups  to  overcome  collateral 
problems (Mosley, 1996; Ouma, 2002). The Grameen Bank model is one of a kind that 
utilizes  group  lending.  This  concept  originated  in  1976  in  Bangladesh  as  an  action-
research project to test the hypothesis that if the poor are supplied with working capital, 
they  can  generate  productive  self-employment  without  further  external  assistance. 
According to this model households with as little as 0.5 acres of arable land qualify to 
take loans provided they form credit groups (Hossain, 1988).  Zeller et al.(2002) and  
Ghalak, M., (1999) supports this model as it has an important feature of forming groups 
that attach savings to creditworthiness, with peer pressure and membership restrictions, 
which  replace  the  need  for  legal  collateral.  The  success  of  the  model  has  fostered 
numerous, Grameen-style replications around the world since mid 1980s (Hossain, 1988). 
The  replications  have  been  fast  with  widening  loan  portfolios,  particularly  in  Africa 
(Paxton et. al.  2000). Organizations using this model in Kenya include Promotion of 
Rural  Initiatives  and  Development  Enterprises  Ltd  (PRIDE),  Kenya  Women  Finance 
Trust  (KWFT),  Faulu  Kenya,  Kenya  Rural  Enterprise  Programme  (K-Rep),  Women 
Development  Company  (WEDCO),  Small  and  Micro  Enterprise  Programme  (SMEP), 
Family Finance and many others (Mosley, 1996; RoK, 2006).  
 
However, there have been concerns by many authors; Huppi and Feder, (1990); Paxton 
et. al.  (2000); Zeller, (2000) and lately by Onyuma et al, (2005) on whether replications 
of the model in other socio-economic environments such as Africa result in the same 
impact. Other contentious issues in the rural agricultural development arena that creates 
more caution in the rural credit systems are the experiences Africa have had with the so 
called ‘the green revolution’. Green revolution was a success story from Asia, where 
reports  indicate  that  it  was  driven  by  technical  innovations  in  food  production,  in 
particular improved varieties and fertilizer. Here, the experience was a rapid increase in 
yields, with growth in food production that surpassed rapid population growth without any  negative  consequences  (Evenson  and  Golin,  2003).  In  Africa  too  there  has  been 
similar success stories, but not without consequential problems. The increase in use of 
improved  varieties  (as  in  maize)  has  come  with  more  production  risks  due  to  the 
vulnerability of these technologies to harsh local conditions such as pests, disease and 
weather. In effect, African farmers have to contend with another technology; the adoption 
of Genetically Modified Crops (GMC) in order to stay in production. In the face of this 
dilemma,  it  is  worth  noting  that  during  the  campaigns  for  green  revolution  farmers 
abandoned  their  local  technologies  for  the  improved  ones,  which  turned  to  be  more 
susceptible to tropical pests and diseases. GM technologies in food production has had 
hot debate on efficacy and health concerns prompting scientists to shift emphasize to 
conservation  of  the  very  local  germplasms  that  farmers  discarded  during  the  green 
revolution campaigns; creating more dilemma.  
 
It is on similar grounds that this study ventured to establish impacts of Grameen based 
micro-credit  programmes  being  wholesomely  transferred  into  African  rural  socio-
economic  environments.  The  questions  addressed  are  whether  such  credit  systems 
actually lead to increased productivity performance and possible reduced rural poverty 
among the resource poor smallholder farmers. 
 
2 METHODS  
2.1 Study Areas and Sampling 
The study covered two districts in Kenya, namely Nakuru district which falls in the high 
tropics and Kakamega district in the Low tropics. The high tropics region is characterized 
by high yields and viewed as the bedrock of food security in Kenya. Presence of credit 
groups and micro-finance institutions here dates back to mid 1990 following government 
efforts to promote micro-lending across farm and non-farm micro-entrepreneurs. Low 
tropics region of Kakamega is located around the Lake Victoria. This area is categorized 
as Moist Mid-altitude (MM) zone (Hassan, 1998). It is characterized by moderate yields, 
with high poverty levels (65% of households living below 1 US$ per day) (RoK, 2006). 
The two contrasting districts are used to act as representatives of similar environments in 
the country.  
 
2.2 Sampling and Sample Design 
  A multi-stage random sampling methodology was used to arrive at a total sample 
of 400 smallholder farmers. The selection of the sample was based on proportionate to 
size sampling approach as below: 
2 2 / ) ( d PQ Z n=  .
 …………………………………………………….. (1) 
Where, ‘n’ is the sample size ‘Z’=1.96, ‘P’ is the proportion of the population of interest 
ie. smallholder farmers who access credit through group based sources, which stand at 
approximately  a  half  of  smallholder  farmers  population  following  previous  studies. 
Besides, statistically a proportion of 0.5 results is sufficient and reliable size, particularly 
when the population proportion is not known with certainty (Daniel, et al, 1975). The 
variable‘d’ is the significance level and is set at 0.05 because 95% confidence level was used as a cut off point for significance in this study. This also leads to ‘Z’ value of 1.96. 
Variable ‘Q’ is the weighting variable and is computed as 1-P. Therefore, based on the 
above methodology the sample size proposed was: [1.96
2 x 0.5 x 0.5] / [0.05
2] = 385. 
However,  this  figure  was  approximated  to  400  to  conveniently  meet  the  sampling 
procedure. The sampling procedure was as follows; in the first stage, a purposive sample 
of 2 districts was made, while in the second stage a stratified random sampling of 40 
credit groups (20 per district) was then selected. Out of the 20 groups, 10 were those that 
participated in borrowing from MFIs, while the other 10 were those who did not.  Finally, 
in stage three, 10 members from each of the groups were randomly selected, making a 
total of (1 x 20 x 10) = 200 per district. The list of groups was obtained from the Ministry 
of Culture and Social services and Community development officers operating within the 
districts.  
 
2.3 Conceptual and Analytical Approach   
In a typical farm production, income can only be realized a short period after harvest, yet 
expenditures  on  purchased  inputs  must  be  made  in  cash  prior  to  the  harvest.  The 
availability  of  credit  markets  allows  greater  purchased  inputs  and  thus  higher  output 
performance. If a producer has infinite liquidity base then production decisions will be 
independent from consumption decisions (Singh, Square, and Strauss, 1986). However, 
asymmetric  information,  adverse  selection  and  contract  enforcement  problems  that 
characterize credit markets in developing countries prevail giving rise to credit rationing 
as an optimal behaviour (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Ghosh, Moorkerjee and Ray, 1999). 
When credit is rationed potential borrowers cannot obtain the amount of fund they desire 
creating  liquidity  problems  with  input  use  deviating  from  their  optimal  levels,  and 
affecting production. Under such circumstances, the objective of borrowing is to bring 
input use closer to the optimal level, thereby increasing output. This potential gain in 
productivity  is  one  motivation  underlying  credit  programme  interventions  in  many 
developing economies, particularly among the resource poor farm households in Africa. 
In the context of agricultural policy, the most important issue is the magnitude of the 
expected  productivity  gain.  If  the  marginal  productivity  of  such  credit  programme  is 
insignificant, then it would be advisable for such credit resources to be diverted to other 
sectors  where  it  would  be  more  economically  beneficial.  In  this  paper,  we  employ 
propensity  score  matching  and  switching  regime  methodologies  to  evaluate  marginal 
impact  of  group  based  lending  programme  (that  uses  Grameen  lending  approach)  on 
smallholder farmers’ economic performance as measured in total income from productive 
activities.  
 
2.3 Propensity Score Matching Method 
Rosenbaum  and  Rubin  (1983)  pioneered  propensity  score  matching  methodology, 
followed by many other improvements and applications in works by Dehejia and Webba 
(1999; 2002), Becker and Ichino, (2002) and Caliendo and Kopeinig, (2005). Rosenbaum 
and Rubin defined propensity score as conditional probability of treatment given pre-
treatment characteristics of the subject. Their argument is based on the fact that since 
assignment of subjects to treatment and control groups in a given programme may not be 
random, then estimation of the effect of treatment may be biased by the existence of confounding factors. Therefore, they proposed propensity score matching as a away to 
correct the estimation of effects of the programme controlling for the existence of these 
confounding factors based on the idea that the bias is reduced when the comparison is 
performed using participants and control subjects who are similar as possible. To achieve 
this the method summarizes pre-treatment (pre-participation) characteristics into a single 
index known as propensity score, which makes matching feasible. Propensity score is a 
conditional probability estimator, and any discrete choice model such as logit or probit 
can be used as they yield similar results (Caliendo and Kopeinig, (2005), even though 
logit distribution has more density mass in the bounds. This study employs logit model in 
its  estimation,  assuming  logistic  distribution  of  the  sample  means  and  variance.  The 
matching  estimators  used  are  nearest  neighbor,  radius,  kernel  and  stratified  matching 
methods all conditional on propensity score. The propensity score model is expressed as:  
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Where D= (0, 1) is a participating variable (in this case borrowing status) and Xi is a 
vector of pre-participation covariates. Propensity score ensures that matching estimation 
is done on subjects that are similar as possible for effective comparison.   
 
As a result, given a population of units denoted by (i), if the propensity score p(Xi) is 
known the Average Effect of Participation (AEP) can be estimated as: 
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Where (AEP) is the average effect of participation, Y1i and Y0i are the potential outcomes 
for the two counterfactual situations of participation and non-participation respectively, 
p(Xi) is the propensity score, D is the participation variable, where D=1, if participated 
and 0 otherwise. This model works under two assumptions; the balancing assumption and 
conditional  independence  assumption.  The  balancing  assumption  postulates  that 
participation  is  shaped  by  pre-participation  characteristics  or  that  the  balancing  of 
participants  and  controls  is  through  the  propensity  score.  Therefore,  if  p(X)  is  the 
propensity score then  ) ( / i i X p X D ⊥ ------------------------------ (4), ie the exposure to the 
programme  (D)  is  shaped  by  the  pre-participation  covariates  (Xi).  The  balancing 
assumption is thus the propensity score P(D = 1Xi) = P(Xi). Conditional independence 
assumption on the other hand assumes that selection is based on observable covariates of 
the subjects and that all covariates that influence participation and potential outcomes are 
simultaneously observed.  It is expressed as: 
) ( / 0 , 1 i X p D Y Y ⊥ --------------------------------- (5) 
Where,  Y1,Y0  are  the  potential  outcomes  with  and  without  the  programme,  D  is  the 
participation  variable,    P  (Xi),  is  the  propensity  score.  In  other  words,  for  a  given 
propensity score, exposure to the programme is random and therefore participants and 
control  households  should  be  on  average  observationally  identical  (Caliendo  and 
Kopeinig, 2005).  
 2.4 Evaluation of Average Effect of Participation  
Nearest Neighbor Matching  
This  approach  is  whereby  each  participant  is  matched  with  control  individual  that  is 
closest in terms of propensity score. This approach uses random draw with replacement 
or without replacement. In the former case, a control individual is used more than once as 
a match, whereas in the latter case it is considered only once. The choice of matching 
with replacement or without replacement depends on the data as whether propensity score 
distribution is very different in the participants and the control group. For example, if 
there are many participants with high propensity scores but only a few control individuals 
with high propensity scores, one is likely to come up with bad matches as some of the 
high-score participants may be matched to low-score controls. This can be overcome by 
allowing replacement, which reduces the number of distinct controls used to construct the 
counterfactual outcome and thereby increases the variance of the estimator (Smith and 
Todd,  2005).  In  addition,  nearest  neighbor  matching  depends  on  the  order  in  which 
observations  are  matched.  Hence,  this  approach  requires  that  sorting  of  data  by 
propensity  index  is  done  before  matching  (Caliendo  and  Kopeinig,  2005).  We  use 
matching with replacement following routines similar to ones employed by Backer and 
Ichino,  (2002).  Nearest  neighbor  match  is  computed  as  follows:  j i j i p p C − = min   , 
Where Ci  is asset of control units  matched to the treated unit (i), with estimated value of 
the propensity score pi .To complement this method other matching techniques are used 
such as radius matching.  
 
Radius Matching  
In radius matching an individual from the control group is chosen as a matching partner 
for  a  participant  that  lies  within  the  specified  radius  in  terms  of  propensity  score.  A 
benefit of this approach is that it uses only as many comparison units that are available 
within the predefined radius and thus allows for usage of extra units when good matches 
are  available, and  reduce the  risk of numerous  bad matches as may occur in nearest 
neighbor matching. However, one limitation is the difficulty in establishing a priori what 
choice  of  radius  would  be  optimal.  Radius  matching  can  be  expressed 
as } { r p p p C j i j i < − = ,  that  is  to  say,  all  propensity  scores  for  controls  (pj)  falling 
within  a  radius  (r)  from  pi  (propensity  score  of  participant,  i)  are  matched  to  that 
participant (i).  The formula for matching both nearest neighbor and radius can then be 
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-------------------------------------- (6) Where AEP is the average effect of the programme  P i ∈ is the number of controls 
matched with participants, wij are the weights which is 
C N
1
 if unit j is a member of the 
controls that matched the treated and wij=0 otherwise.   
 
 Stratification matching method  
Stratification  matching  method  uses  strata  or  blocks  of  common  support  to  compute 
average effect of the programme on participants. It involves partitioning of the common 
support of the propensity score into a set of intervals or strata, and then calculating the 
impact of the programme within each interval by taking the mean difference in outcomes 
between participants and control observations. The number of strata to be used is usually 
the  main  challenging  factor.  However,  Aakvik,  (2001)  and  Caliendo  and  Kopeinig, 
(2005) show that five strata are often enough to remove 95% of the bias associated with 
one single covariate. In this sense provided the common support condition is met with a 
minimum  of  5  blocks,  then,  the  same  blocks  can  be  used  in  stratified  matching.  In 
addition, as is pointed out in Imbens (2004); unconfoundedness is associated with the 
propensity score implying that under rational decision making one can specify at least a 
minimum of five strata from the propensity score estimation. The formulation within 
















AEP ∑ ∑ ∈ ∈ − =
) ( ) (
------------------------ (7) 
 
Where  I  (q)  is  the  set  of  units  in  block  q  while 
P
q N   and 
C
q N   are  the  numbers  of 
participants and control units in block q. The AEP for all the strata are then averaged to 
arrive at total samples’ AEP.    
 
Kernel matching method  
With Kernel Matching (KM) each participant is matched with a weighted average of all 
controls  with  weights  that  are  inversely  proportional  to  the  distance  between  the 
propensity  scores  of  participants  and  controls.  Kernel  matching  is  a  non-parametric 
estimator that uses weighted averages of all individuals in the control group to construct 
the counterfactual outcomes. One major advantage of this approach is the lower variance 
which is achieved because more information is used. Hence, the proper imposition of the 
common  support  condition  is  of  major  importance  for  Kernel  Matching  (Heckman, 
Ichimura, and Todd, 1998). When applying KM one has to choose the kernel function 
and the bandwidth parameter. A high bandwidth-value yield a smoother estimated density 
function, therefore leading to a better fit and a decreasing variance between the estimated 
and  the  true  underlying  density  function.  The  bandwidth  choice  is  therefore  a 
compromise  between  a  small  variance  and  an  unbiased  estimate  of  the  true  density 

























































Where G (.) is a kernel function and hn is a bandwidth parameter (default is 0.06), Under 
standard conditions on the bandwidth and kernel the following expression is a consistent 
estimator of the counterfactual outcome Y0i. Stata version 8.2 is used to arrive at the 
above estimators. 
 
2.5 Endogenous Switching Regime Model  
To  estimate  the  effect  of  borrowing  on  output  via  purchased  factors  we  employ 
endogenous switching regime model. Since credit is an indirect input into production 
process,  factoring  borrowing  directly  into  a  production  function  would  lead  to 
endogeneity  problem.  Besides,  credit  is  also  exogenous  to  purchased  factors  such  as 
fertilizer  and  hired  labour  in  the  same  function.  Therefore,  inclusion  of  borrowing 
directly would lead to biased estimates. To resolve this dilemma, we employ endogenous 
switching regime model as in Madalla (1993); Greene, (2003) and used by Main and 
Reilly (1993), and Millimet (2003). We begin by expressing the general output function 
with credit variable as follows: 
 
i i i i i X D Y ε β λ + + = ……………………….…………………………………( 9) 
Where Y is the outcome, D is a dummy whereby D=1 if borrowed, D=0, otherwise, Xi  is 
a vector of conventional production factors, which include purchased inputs and other 
socio-economic factors. In the above function, D is endogenous to Y, and exogenous to 
some  of  the  Xi  covariates.  Therefore,  the  model  involves  splitting  the  sample  into 
borrowers and non-borrowers and then estimating the structural equations for each sub-
sample as follows: 
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 for the non-borrowers sub-sample ………..(11) 
Where;  y1  and  y2  are  the  outcomes  for  borrowers  and  non-borrower’s  sub-samples 
respectively. X1i and X2i are the conventional factors that influence outcome functions for 
borrowers and non-borrowers respectively. D is a dummy (D=1, if borrowed and D=0, 
otherwise),  Zi  is  a  vector  of  conditional  covariates  that  influence  the  probability  of 
participating in the borrowing programme.  β1i,   β2i   i γ   are the corresponding vectors of 
parameters  and  ε1i  ε2i  εi  are  random  disturbances.  The  (y)  variables  are  observed 
conditional on the unknown criterion determined by the D function, which is estimated 
via a probit model to yield  i γ  estimates. The estimated  i γ  are then used to generate mills ratios, which are incorporated in the second stage estimates where equations y1 and y2 
with their mills ratio corrections are estimated using heckman two-step routines to yield 
average production estimates. Under the model assumptions, the estimated coefficients 
are efficient and asymptotically normal. Essentially this model allows for the full set of 
interaction terms between borrowing status and factors of production, particularly the 
purchased factors. Besides, it allows evaluation of the contribution of credit among other 
factors in production and the marginal differences of coefficients in purchased factors can 
be attributed to the contribution of borrowing to production. An alternative to switching 
regime model, but which would yield similar results is Two Stage Method of Moments 
(TSM) (Miranda, 2003). 
 
3 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
3.1 Factors that Influence Participation in MFI Credit 
In reference to the above assumptions, this sub-section presents results of the factors 
hypothesized to influence participation in MFI-credit. Model specification results show 
that all significant variables hypothesized met the cut off point of 5% significance level 
(see Table 1). In addition, the chi-square (X
2) statistics stood at 100 and was significant at 
1%, indicating the significance in the explanatory powers of the variables included in the 
model. The Pseudo R
2 was also 28%, higher than the cut-off point of 20%, implying that 
a high percentage of the changes in the dependent were associated with the variables in 
question.  The  covariates  show  marginal  changes  in  the  predicted  probabilities  of 
participation  in  MFI-credit.  Presentation  of  marginal  probabilities  enables  ease  in  the 
interpretation of the covariates, and reflects marginal changes of the dependent due to a 
unit change in the covariates.  
 
Further, results show that formal education, attendance to agricultural seminars, female 
gender,  time-spent  daily  on  off-farm  activity  and  access  to  other  sources  of  credit 
significantly  increased  the  marginal  probability  of  a  household  participating  in  MFI 
credit. On the other hand, the number of household members aged above 50 years and 
distance  to  the  market,  significantly  reduced  the  marginal  probability  of  a  household 
participating in MFI-credit, see Table 8. Detailed interpretation and discussion of each 
variable follow the table.   Table 1: Marginal Effects for Factors that Influence participation in MFI-Credit  




    LR 
X
2   
101**
* 
Log likelihood  -225        Pseudo  R
2  0.283 
Dep: if MFI participant  
(Yes=1, No=0)  dy/dx 
Std. 
Err.  z-test  P>|z|   95%  C.L.     X 
Age of head (Yrs)  0.002  0.003  0.7  0.483  -0.03  0.007  44.15 
Head Education (Yrs)  0.023  0.007  3.58  0.000  0.011  0.036  8.998 
If attended seminar (1,0)  0.209  0.062  3.35  0.001  0.087  0.331  0.249 
If head is female (1,0)  0.161  0.06  2.66  0.008  0.042  0.279  0.641 
Hld members below 20 yrs  -0.017  0.012  -1.4  0.161  -0.04  0.007  2.895 
Hld members aged 21-49 
yrs  0.029  0.014  2.06  0.039  0.001  0.056  2.379 
Hld members>50 yrs  -0.124  0.038  -3.3  0.001  -0.19  -0.05  0.688 
If own title to land (1,0)  -0.008  0.085  -0.09  0.927  -0.17  0.159  0.845 
If received transfers (1,0)  -0.057  0.058  -1.1  0.329  -0.17  0.057  0.364 
Hrs on off-farm 
activity/daily  0.139  0.024  5.72  0.000  0.091  0.186  0.968 
If borrowed other credit 
(1,0)  0.16  0.06  2.68  0.007  0.043  0.277  0.342 
Members in a group  -0.003  0.002  -1.4  0.161  -0.01  0.001  26.89 
Distance to market (km)  -0.005  0.003  -1.71  0.031  -0.01  0.001  4.92 
AEZ (Nakuru=1, Kak=0)  0.065  0.063  1.02  0.306  -0.05  0.189  0.504 
 
3.2 Estimates of Average Effect of MFI credit on Beneficiaries’ Performance 
This section presents results of propensity score matching discussed in chapter three. The 
findings present the average effect of participation in MFI borrowing on household’s 
annual income from all productive activities. These were incomes generated during the 
production period 2005, immediately after borrowing. Results are presented in Table 2 
and interpretations together with discussion of the results broken into different matching 
approaches, namely nearest neighbor, radius, kernel and stratified matching. 
 
Results on Nearest Neighbor Matching (NNM) show that all the 180 participants matched 
71 non-participants, with average effect of participation on annual productive incomes of 
Ksh. 48,113.24 per household. The results were significantly different at 1% level with a 
t-value of 3.83. Distributed on a monthly basis translates to an average of Ksh. 4,000 
difference in income between participants and non-participants. In a household made up 
of six members as in this survey, it translates to 22 additional Kenya shillings per person 
per day. This implies that MFI credit could reduce poverty levels by 30% of a dollar by 
the time of survey (1 US$ = Ksh. 75.00). 
 
Radius  matching  was  estimated  with  a  default  of  0.005,  implying  that  all  the  non-
participants  with  estimated  propensity  scores  falling  within  a  radius  0.005  from  the 
propensity  score  of  a  given  participant  was  matched  to  that  particular  participant. 
Following on this, results reveal that 150 non-participants matched 133 participants, with a significant difference on productive income of Ksh 47,134.65, t-value of 4.15 and p-
value of 0.001.   
 
Kernel  matching  and  stratified  matching  results  show  that  all  180  participants 
(borrowers) matched with all the 221 non-participants (non-borrowers), with an average 
effect on productive income of Ksh. 35,873.25. In both cases, the measurements were 
significant at 1% level, with t-values of 3.64 and 3.74 respectively.  
Table 2 :  Effects of Participation in MFIs Credit on Productive Performance 




(Ksh)  Std. Err.  t-value 
Nearest neighbor  180  71  48,113.24  12,562.15  3.83 
Radius   133  150  47,134.65  11,354.68  4.15 
Kernel   180  221  35,873.25  9,863.50  3.64 
Stratified   180  221  35,873.25  9,592.85  3.74 
 
Paying attention to all the matching results, one observes a general positive effect of 
participation in MFI credit on households’ productive incomes in the range of Ksh 35,873 
and Ksh. 48,113 in one production period. All the four measurements were significant at 
1%, indicating the important role MFIs credit plays in improving economic performance 
of  rural  resource  poor  farm  households.  According  to  Backer  and  Ichino,  (2002),  a 
combination of any three of the matching approaches (Nearest Neighbor, Stratified and 
Kernel) should be adequate to arrive at a reliable conclusion on the relative effect of the 
programme.  On  this  breath,  results  from  this  survey  lead  to  a  strong  conclusion  on 
significant and positive effect of MFI-credit on economic performance of smallholder 
farmers in Kenya.  
 
One major challenge that could face MFIs operating among the rural communities in 
Kenya is sustainability. The question of sustainability of micro-credit among agricultural 
based households would definitely need state intervention to provide a conducive road 
infrastructure  and  markets  for  products  to  ensure  ability  to  sell  produce  at  profitable 
prices in order to commit to loan repayments 
 
 
3.3  Effects of MFI Credit on Performance via Purchased Factor Use 
This section presents results of the switching regression model, which show effects of 
MFI-credit  on  total  annual  farm  income  through  purchased  factors.  The  switching 
regression model results are preceded by probit maximum likelihood estimates presented 
in Tables 1.  The role of probit regression is to obtain estimates of the selection terms. It 
also yields results on the factors hypothesized to influence participation in the MFI credit 
market and used as a first stage for both second stage switching regression model and 
propensity score matching approaches explained earlier.  
 
The model fit show Wald X
2 of 99.86 for MFI-participants’ function and 121.250 for 
non-participants, both of which indicate 1% significance, implying that the explanatory 
variables included were important in predicting changes in the dependent. Besides, the inverse  mills  ratios  (selection  variables)  for  both  functions  show  5%  significance, 
implying existing correlation between error terms of respective first stage and second 
stage equations, and thus the appropriateness in use of the sample selection correction. 
The likelihood ratio test of no selection problem was also significant at 1% level for MFI-
participants, thus rejecting the null hypothesis of no selection problem.  
 
Results on the explanatory variables show that value of livestock assets and extension 
contact had different implications between MFI participants and non-participants. For 
participants,  livestock  assets  had  positive  influence  on  the  production  function  as 
expected,  but  negative  for  non-participants,  while  the  reverse  applied  for  extension 
contact.  However,  all  other  traditional  variables  such  as  farm  size,  improved  inputs, 
labour and market access, had similar signs for MFI-participants and non-participants as 
expected. 
 
On the respective influence of hypothesized variables on production functions, results 
show that farm size, fertilizer, livestock feeds and planting materials, business income 
and  family  labour  were  more  important  among  MFI-participants.  On  the  contrary, 
investment in chemicals, hired labour and transfer income were more important among 
non-participants compared to participants.  
 
Table 3: Heckman (MLE) on Factors Influencing Productive Performance  
*=significant at 0.10, **=significant at 0.05 and ***=significant at 0.01 
 
Full Sample  n=401  n=401 
Uncensored  Sample  180  221 
Wald X
2   99.860***  121.250*** 
Dep: ln Value of output (Ksh)  MFI-Participants  Non-Participants. 
ln of farm size  0.303***  0.258*** 
ln value of fertilizer  0. 123***  0. 033** 
ln value of feeds/plant materials  0.043**  0.011** 
ln value of chemicals & vet  0.004**  0.047*** 
ln of business income  0.084***  0.062*** 
ln hired labour in hours  0.002*  0.056* 
ln family labour in hours  0.308***  0.192** 
ln value of livestock assets  0.018  -0.013 
ln of age of head  -0.450  -0.172 
ln of education of head (years)  -0.310***  -0.016** 
ln value of transfer income  0.024**  0.032** 
ln number of extension contacts  -0.041  0.095 
ln distance to local market in km  -0.083  -0.074 
AEZ (1,0)   0.432  0.044 
Intercept  12.131  8.953 
Inverse mills Ratio  -0.664***  0.161** 
Sigma  0.984  0.947 
LR X
2 Test for indep. of equations  -16.96***               0.93 
Chow F-Value         32.013***   3.4 Factors that Influence Household Poverty  
Results  on  poverty  reduction  presented  using  logistic  odds  ratios  and  not  probability 
estimates. Odds ratio signifies change in the likelihood of poverty given a unit change in 
the respective covariates (Ngigi, 2002; Kohler and Kreuler, 2005; Johnston and DiNardo, 
2007). Because of ease and meaningful interpretation this study used odds ratio. Poverty 
is defined here as living below 1 US$ per day per person in a given household. Therefore, 
the dependent variable was a dummy with (1) indicating that the average per person 
income in a household fell below 1 US$ per day, and (0), otherwise. This  imply that 
factors that had positive influence on the dependent were those that increased chances for 
a given household to remain poor, while negative factors reduced chances of a household 
to remain poor.  
 
Model  specification  show  a  log  likelihood  of  -349.58  and  a  Wald-chi-square  (X
2)  of 
58.33,  which  was  significant  at  1%  level  and  13  degrees  of  freedom  (Table  10), 
indicating that the hypothesized exogenous factors included in the model were important 
in  explaining  changes  in  poverty.  Besides,  pseudo  R
2  of  27%  was  also  above  the 
statistical threshold of 20%, confirming that a large proportion of changes in poverty 
were attributed to the covariates considered.  
 
The  odds  ratio  for  MFI  credit  averaged  0.066  and  was  significant  at  6%,  indicating 
important role linkage-credit play in reducing poverty. The fungibility nature of this type 
of credit allows borrowers to meet a variety of needs including consumption expenditures 
such  as  medical,  school  fees,  food  and  social  emergencies,  besides  expenditures  on 
productive inputs. On education the odds ratio of 0.903,was significant at 5% indicating 
that  literacy  is  instrumental  in  accessing  credit  information.  Education  enables  a 
household to easily conceptualize information and take advantage of available profitable 
investment  opportunities,  which  improve  household  wellbeing.  Furthermore,  educated 
decision  makers  are  better  equipped  to  compete  for  off-farm  employment,  which 
command  higher  income.  Therefore,  access  to  knowledge  gives  important  impetus  to 
household welfare. 
 
The odds for livestock assets as an indicator for wealth endowment reveal that a unit 
increase in livestock assets reduced the likelihood of a household living in poverty by 
0.511. In Africa livestock assets are widely used in preparation of land such as the case of 
ox-drawn  ploughs,  thus  reducing  expenditures  on  labour,  and  enabling  timely  land 
preparation, a factor that is associated with high yields and incomes. Findings on effects 
of access to transfer income on poverty confirms the hypothesis, with results showing 
that a unit increase in access to transfer earnings reduced the likelihood of a household 
remaining below poverty line by 0.668. The odds ratio was significant at 4%, pointing at 
the  heavy  reliance  of  households  to  transfer  earnings  to  escape  poverty,  particularly 
among those residing in the low potential areas. Dependence on transfer income becomes 
even more acute in marginal production areas, forcing rural households to depend on 
transfer earnings from working relatives. Policy intervention on transfer earning can take 
the form of tax rebates, whereby tax cuts could be extended to those who regularly send 






Table 4 : Factors that Influence Household Poverty   
(Dependent  variable:  poverty  (1=households  with  less  than  1  US$/day/person, 
0=otherwise) 
Odds Ratio-Logit estimates  N  =  600    LR X
2  58.3*** 
Log likelihood  -349.58      Pseudo  R





Err.  z-stat  p>|z|  95%  CL 
If MFI-participant (1,0)  0.663  0.16  -1.71  0.058  0.414  1.063 
If borrowed other credit (1,0)  0.976  0.199  -0.12  0.903  0.654  1.455 
Age of head (yrs)  0.996  0.008  -0.46  0.649  0.981  1.012 
Education of head (yrs)  0.903  0.021  -4.35  0.000  0.862  0.945 
If head is female (1,0)  1.31  0.294  1.2  0.229  0.844  2.035 
If head is male (1,0)  0.861  0.211  -0.61  0.541  0.532  1.392 
if access to transfer (1,0)  0.668  0.129  -2.09  0.037  0.457  0.975 
if own title to land(1,0)  0.813  0.244  -0.69  0.491  0.451  1.465 
Hrs on off-farm activity/day (1,0)  0.965  0.078  -0.44  0.659  0.824  1.13 
if group member (1,0)  1.011  0.228  0.05  0.961  0.65  1.574 
Distance to market (km)  1.005  0.002  2.32  0.02  1.001  1.009 
Ownership of Livestock (ksh)  0.511  0.169  -2.03  0.042  0.267  0.977 
AEZ (Nak=1, Kaka=0)  0.631  0.134  -2.18  0.03  0.417  0.955 
 
The odds ratio for market access as measured in distance to the local market was positive 
(1.005), and significant at 2% level, indicating that a unit increase in distance resulted in 
1.005  units  increase  in  the  likelihood  of  a  household  remaining  under  poverty.  This 
indicates the negative impact of transaction costs in accessing input and product markets. 
The effect of market access is thus important for better prices and in lowering production 
costs for the purchased production inputs. Agricultural ecological zone as indicator for 
the effects of differentials in climatic conditions had odds ratio of 0.631, which was 
negative but significant at 3% level. The importance of agro-ecology here indicates a 
strong linkage between poverty and agricultural production. Female-headed households 
had a higher chance of remaining poor, while households headed by male had a higher 
chance of getting out of poverty, although the results were insignificant. The effect of 
gender here echoes the nature of structures of many rural communities in Africa, where 
poverty takes a female face.  
 
4 CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Participation in MFI credit has gains in income that range between 300 to 480 Euros as 
well as significant effects on output via purchased factors, with literacy, female gender, 
communication  infrastructure  and  maintenance  of  indigenous  group  structures  as  key factors  for  policy  intervention.  Mobilizing  more  groups,  particularly  women  groups 
would go further in improving information asymmetry and resolving collateral problems. 
Besides, improvement of rural road infrastructure would have multiple impact of access 
to credit, labour and product markets. Last but not least, result point at the fact that the  
greatest gains on poverty reduction can only be achieved through stimulating an efficient 
agricultural sector through credit provision, education interventions, promotion of wealth 
creation, by ensuring that legal rights to property spreads across all gender, and reducing 
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